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INVENTIVE activity, perhaps more than any other single economic
endeavor, mirrors our "mixed" economy. The government has
assumed primary responsibility for research relating to the Navy
since 1789, and for research in agriculture since the creation of the
Department of Agriculture and the land-grant college system in
1862.' It has participated directly in the design of weapons, surface
craft, aircraft, missiles and rockets, in the development and control of
atomic energy, radio and telecommunications, and in the promotion
of science and public health. Except for these areas, and perhaps a
few additional ones, control of inventive activity traditionally has
been left to a system of private incentives which the government
affects only indirectly through the institutions of public law.
An assessment of the impact of government controls and the legal
environment on inventive activity in the United States requires,
therefore, at the outset a systematic classification of such activity
according to the prevailing direct and indirect means of public control
(Table 1). From such a classification it immediately becomes clear
that inventive activity is subject to a wide variety of controls, and that
these controls vary greatly according to type and source of inventive
activity.
Research financed and performed directly by the government is
subject to the system of political controls applicable to budget items
generally. The total sums expended are therefore determined by
what the President proposes and Congress approves, and in turn by
how serious each considers the "present need" to be. For example,
in the decade preceding World War lithe federal government spent
on the average less than $40 million per year on research and develop-
ment; the annual average for 1941—45 was $500 million,2 reflecting
'The federal government had assumed responsibility for dissemination of plants, seeds,
and certain information relating to agriculture as early as 1839.
2Science and PublicPolicy, thePresident'sScientificResearchBoard,1947, Vol. 1,p. 10.
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TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY ACCORDING TO
MEANSOF PUBLICCONTROL
Inventive Activity Means of Public Control
GOVERNMENT
Directresearch Budgetary process
Research contracted to the private Budgetary process and patent, antitrust
sector and taxation laws
Support of scientific education Budgetary process and educational
institution policy
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESS FIRMS
Self-financed research Patent, antitrust and taxation laws
Financed under government contract Budgetary process and patent, antitrust
and taxation laws
Research contracts with and donations toEducational institution policy and tax





the need for massive military research. The federal government in the
pre-Sputnik years 1952—57 spent on the average $76 million per year
on space exploration and flight technology. The 1960 fiscal year
budget called for expenditures of $325 million and the proposed 1961
budget, the first to follow the Soviet Union's successful lunar probe,
called for $600 million.3 These figures serve only to emphasize the
point that the level of government supported inventive activity is
determined as much by the forces of politics as it is by "pure" econo-
mic considerations. This is true not only because the dollar magnitude
of specific items in the federal budget must be politically accept-
able, but also because research and development expenditures for
such purposes as defense, space exploration, public health, and so on,
are not readily determinable by marginal social cost—marginal social
benefit analysis. It is impossible even to measure in terms of current
dollars the marginal cost to society of a given increase in taxes, much
less the marginal social benefit of a successful flight to the moon in
1962 as compared with 1965.
President Eisenhower's Budget Message to Congress, January 18, 1960, as reproduced
in the New York Times, January 19, 1960, p. 17.
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Educational institution policy
Budgetary process and educational
institution policy
Educational institution policy and tax
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Government research contracted to private firms is also controlled
primarily by the budgetary process, although such aspects of the legal
environment as the patent, antitrust, and taxation laws are not totally
inapplicable. Government research contracts sometimes specify that
patentable discoveries made in the course of such research belong to
the government, and hence are not patentable by the contracting
firms. Some contracts permit firms to patent but provide that the
government may obtain royalty-free licenses.4 In either case the
patent incentive is somewhat weakened. But, as Usher has persuasively
argued, any achievement of large social importance involves the cumu-
lative synthesis of several strategic inventions.5 The prohibition, or the
provision for royalty-free licensing to the government, applies to the
contracted research but not to the subsequent' synthesis which may
produce a patentable invention. Similarly, while the antitrust laws
may not be directly applicable to research performed under a particu-
lar government contract, the distribution of prime contracts by size
of firm and the effect the research may have on the future market
position of the contracting firm raise antitrust considerations. The
effect the corporate income tax has on such research is not readily
discernible but will depend, among other factors, on the contracting
firm's current profit position and on whether it would have engaged
in similar research activities on its own.
Government research contracted to educational and other non-
profit organizations is controlled by the budgetary process and the
policies of the recipient institutions. In the case of universities such
policies usually relate to the issues of academic freedom, the com-
patibility of the contract research with the university's overall research
program, the special research interests of the scientists involved, and
so on.
Research expenditures for inventive activity conducted by private
firms (and individuals) are governed by the profit motive subject to
incentives and constraints that inhere in the legal environment. The
patent laws, which are essentially a means for making new knowledge
public in exchange for a 17-year right to monopolize the use of an
invention, are designed to serve as a stimulus; they provide the inven-
tor with an alternative to secrecy, an alternative he would not have in
Cf.GayleParker, "Comparison of the Patent Provisions of the NASA Act and AEC
Act," Patent,Trademark, and Copyright Journal of Researchand Education,FaIl1959,
pp. 303—316.
Abbott P. Usher, A History of Mechanical Inventions, rev. ed., Harvard University.
Press, 1954, pp. 68—69.
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their absence. Presumably the corporate income tax serves both as an
incentive and as a constraint. Corporations, because they are permitted
to expense rather than capitalize research expenditures, may with some
justification reason that each dollar spent on research reduces profits
after taxes by only $0.48.8Onthe other hand, the income tax signi-
ficantly reduces what Schumpeter has called the pool of uncommitted
retained earnings which corporations may use for new and untried
ventures. It can be said that, on balance, the corporate income tax acts
as an incentive if an increase of $1.00 in after-tax profits would lead
to new expenditures on research of less than $0.48, and as a constraint
if more than $0.48. A similar line of reasoning applies to corporate
donations to universities and other nonprofit institutions for research
purposes. The impact of the antitrust laws, the complexity of which
defies the brevity an introductory statement imposes, is generally
supposed to be favorable to inventive activity on the ground that it
stimulates competitive effort, which often takes the form of an inno-
vational race against competitors.
Of the three principal seats of research activity given attention in
this study the educational and nonprofit institutions are the least
affected by economic, political, and legal controls. They are by
definition nonprofit organizations and for this reason are liberated
from profits maximizing incentives. While both scientist and institu-
tion have patented certain of their inventions, patentability is not an
important consideration in the conduct of their research. A few, but
probably only a few, are affected by political criteria of the sort that
determine the research items in the federal government's budget. They
are unaffected by the antitrust laws and, although they may be favor-
ably affected by income tax regulations, they are not guided in their
research to any considerable extent by tax considerations. Even in
their conduct of research under government contract such institutions
generally have held out for a minimum of contractual constraints.7
This relative freedom from control is, from an analytical point of view,
not an unmixed blessing. Because nonprofit institutions are free to
pursue within very broad limits whatever research they wish, what
they in fact will pursue is highly unpredictable. They are susceptible
6has been argued that such expenditures should be capitalized. cf National Science
Foundation, Proceedingsof a Conference on Research and Development and Its Impact on
the Economy, 1958, p. 122.
Some universities have voiced apprehension over the increasing amount of contract
research and the limitations it imposes on the freedom of individual research scientists.
See Harold W. Dodds on "Projectitis" in Official Registerof Princeton University:The
President'sReport, 1952—53, January1, 1954, pp. 19—24.
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to neither political nor economic analysis since they presumably are
motivated by neither political nor economic incentives.
In sum, inventive activity in the United States is affected by a wide
variety of incentives and legal institutions. The array of incentives
includes what the government considers to be in the public interest
and politically feasible, the profit motive, the quest for knowledge, the
urge to create, and pure humanitarianism. Institutions that act to
constrain or release these motives include the budgetary process, the
patent system, the income tax laws, the antitrust laws, and what may
be loosely defined as the policies of educational and other nonprofit
institutions.
Quantitative Importance of Incentives and Controls
By historical coincidence estimates of advertising and of research
and development outlays both reached the $10 billion mark in 1957.
Data on advertising are voluminous; those on research and devel-
opment—though technological change is the principal source of the
American economy's sustained increase in productivity8—are intoler-
ably inadequate. In part the problem is one of coverage: all surveys
exclude individual inventors, and most exclude small firms. In part
it is one of definition: a thin line separates technical effort from tech-
nical effort to create. As Dexter Keezer has put it, when Joe fixes a
tractor it is repair; if he fails to fix it it is research.9 Even references to
federal government research outlays do not always distinguish between
funds obligated and funds expended, or between calendar and fiscal
years. And data from different sources, even from the same source,
are not easily reconciled.'0
But in spite of these inadequacies the data unmistakably show sig-
nificant shifts in the relative importance of the various financial
sources of inventive activity, and hence in the various means of social
control (Table 2). In 1930 industry accounted for 70 per cent of total
research and development expenditures, nonprofit institutions (mainly
universities) for 16 per cent, and the federal government for only 14
per cent. In 1959 the federal government financed 60 per cent of total
8Someestimates of the contribution technological change has made to productivity run
as high as 87 per cent. See Robert M. Solow, "Technological Change and the Aggregate
Production Function," Review of Economics andStatistics, August1957, pp. 3 12—320.
Those who think this estimate too high generally consider technological change to be the
most important single factor. See Richard Nelson, "The Economics of Invention: A
Survey of the Literature," Journal of Business, April 1959, P. 102.
National Science foundation, op. cit.,p.146.
10Seenote to Table 2.
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TABLE 2




Source and Nature of Expenditure 1930average19531956 1959
Government 23 500 2,8105,2347,200
Research performed in government n.a.n.a. 9701,400 1,600
Research contracted to private sector n.a.n.a. 1,8403,8345,600
Industry n.a.n.a. 1,5003,1344,600
University n.a. n.a. 340 7001,000
Other n.a.n.a.
Business firms 116 80 3,8706,0009,100
Self-financed n.a.n.a. 2,3702,9004,500
Government financed n.a.n.a. 1,5003,1344,600
Donations to nonprofit institutions n.a.n.a. 10 — —





Self-financed n.a.n.a. 180 300 300
Government financed n.a.n.a. 340 7001,000
Business financed and other sources n.a.n.a. 10n.a. n.a.
Totals (duplications eliminated) 166 600 5,4009,00012,000
SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Proceedings of a Conferenceon Researchand
Developmentand its Impacton the Economy,1958,pp. 170— 178; Scienceand Public
Policy, a Report to the President by John R. Steelman, Chairman, Scientific
Research Board, 1947, Vol.1,p.10; Business Plans, 1956—1959, Prepared by the
McGraw-Hill Department of Economics, New York, McGraw Hill, 1956, p. 13; and
Dexter M. Keezer, Douglas Greenwald, and Robert P. Ulin, "The Outlook for
Expenditures on Research and Development During the Next Decade," American
Economic Review, May 1960, p. 355. Where estimates varied, as they usually did, the
most recent compilation was used.
aIncludesstate government.
n.a. =Notavailable.
research and development expenditures, industry 38 per cent, and
nonprofit institutions less than 3 per cent. A corresponding shift has
occurred in the relative importance of the instruments of control over
the private and public sectors of the economy. In 1930 and up to the
outbreak of World War II, approximately 70 per cent of all inventive
activity occurred in industry, which nominally was subject to the
profit motive and the patent and antitrust laws; in recent years this
share has been reduced to less than 40 per cent. Meanwhile, the share
controlled by federal budgetary considerations had risen by 1959
from 14 per cent to 60 per cent. In decisions concerned with the
financing of inventive activity, therefore, political feasibility and what
592GOVERNMENT CONTROLS AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
the government considers to be the public need have become the
principal instruments of control, replacing private profit incentives
and the traditional legal instruments of antitrust laws and the patent
system.
No similar shift has occurred in research and development perform-
ance. In 1953 private industry performed 72 per cent of all inventive
activity as measured by research and development funds expended,
the federal government 12 per cent, and nonprofit institutions, such
as universities, 10 per cent. In 1956 industry performed 70 per cent,
and in 1959 76 per cent. This pattern of performance does not differ
significantly from that of the thirties. Data on inventive activity, like
that on corporate ownership, reveal what may be called the "Berle
and Means effect"—a divorcement of control over research finance
and research performance.
The sharp difference in the pattern of research performance and
research financing is explained by the pronounced increase in federal
government research appropriations and the use of such funds to
support research in the private sector of the economy. In 1959 the
government contracted 78 per cent of its total appropriations for
research and development out to the private sector—64 per cent to
industry and 14 per cent to nonprofit institutions. These contracted
funds accounted for 51 per cent of the total inventive activity per-
formed by industry and for 77 per cent of that performed by non-
profit institutions.
The impact of government-supported research is spread far from
evenly throughout American industry. For the total research and
development performed by industry and financed by government in
1956, 58 per cent of the funds went for aircraft and parts, 23 per cent
for electrical equipment, 8 per cent for machinery, and 3 per cent for
professional and scientific instruments. The four industries alone
accounted for 92 per cent of the total research and development funds
supplied by government to industry. Telecommunications and broad-
casting accounted for an additional 2 per cent. In these five industries,
all of which are vitally tied up with the Nation's defense effort, govern-
ment sponsored research accounts for from 40 per cent to nearly
90 per cent of total research expenditures. The remaining 6 per cent
of government-sponsored research in industry—federal funds of $136
million—appears to be spread thinly and evenly over the rest of the
private sector of the economy.
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One side effect of these developments deserves emphasis. Through-
out the 1930's universities accounted for slightly less than 25 per cent
of all research expenditures. Since it is generally agreed that during this
period universities were primarily preoccupied with basic research,
and that government and business made only a modest contribution
at that level, it seems reasonable to conclude that basic research
accounted for something in excess of one-quarter of total research
expenditures. In 1953 basic research expenditures amounted to
$435 million,1' more than was spent on all types of research in the
1930's but still only 8 per cent of total research expenditures in 1953.
Relative to total research, therefore, basic research has declined. And
the sources of funds for basic research, as in the case of total research,
have on an increasing scale become divorced from the locus of
research performance. In 1953 the federal government financed 36
per cent but performed only 11 per cent of all basic research; colleges
and universities financed only 14 per cent but performed slightly
more than 47 per cent; other nonprofit institutions financed about
9 per cent and performed 3 per cent; and industry financed 41 per
cent and performed slightly less than 39 per cent.'2 Only in industry,
which performs less than two-fifths of the total, is the decision to
engage in basic research tied directly to the decision to finance it.
What effect have these recent trends had on the traditional incen-
tives for, and instruments of control over, inventive activity? The
data strongly suggest that they play a relatively less important role
in the inventive process than they formerly did. Even if we make some
allowance for the possibility that industry takes on a portion of the
government financed research with an eye toward increasing its patent
holdings and profits in the distant future, it can still be reasonably con-
cluded that the traditional incentives and institutional controls govern-
ing inventive activity have given considerable ground to the political,
welfare, and defense (the three are not mutually exclusive) considera-
tions which come into play in the federal budgetary process.
It does not follow from this, of course, that approximately two-
fifths of all research outlays are prompted by commercial incentives
and governed by the patent system and the antitrust laws. The above
"National Science Foundation, op. cit.,p.171.
12Ibid.These data probably understate the extent of divorcement. Industry receives
substantial sums for basic research from the federal government and supplies substantial
sums to universities and other nonprofit organizations. The gross difference between basic
research financed and basic research performed by industry would be considerably greater
than the net difference.
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data omit altogether the activity of the free-lance inventor. While
his contribution to total inventive effort has unquestionably under-
gone a relative decline over the past half-century,'3 there are no grounds
for writing it off as insignificant.14 And, as pointed out earlier, re-
search financed by government but performed by industry may not
be completely divorced from the traditional incentives and instru-
ments of public control. Finally, a significant portion of the research
financed by industry would probably be carried on in the absence of
patent protection. The eleventh annual McGraw-Hill survey of 1956
showed that about 50percent of all reporting companies were con-
ducting research on new products, 41 per cent were conducting
research on product improvement, and only II per cent reported
research on new processes.15 Research on new products and processes
may be motivated by patentability, but the bulk of the research on
product improvement probably reflects the exertion of competitive
effort to keep abreast or move ahead of rivals in established markets.
Such research effort is a normal aspect of product competition, much
of which is carried on without the incentives afforded by the patent
system.'6 If we were to make the rather heroic assumption that such
competitive research just about offset the unreported research carried
on by free-lance inventors, and the further assumption that the patent
system had a negligible effect on industry research financed by govern-
ment, it could be concluded that the patent and antitrust laws were
applicable to approximately two-fifths of all inventive activity.'7 Since
there are no satisfactory means for testing the validity of either assump-
tion, the soundest conclusion is that in recent years no more than one-
Evidenceof the relative decline in the role of what is romantically referred to as the
attic inventor is found in patent assignments. According to data supplied by P.J. Frederico
of the United States Patent Office, in 1900over80 per cent of all patents issued were
assigned directly to individuals and less than 20 per cent to corporations; in 1955 about
39 per cent were assigned to individuals, 59 per cent to corporations, and slightly over
2 per cent to the government.
Thepress frequently reports inventions patented by individuals. See report on new
carbonated beverage bottle cap patented in January 1960 by Clyde A. Tolson, top aid to
J. Edgar Hoover, New York Times, January 23, 1960, p. 26.
NationalScience Foundation, op. cit., p. 123.
18A.F. Ravenshear drew this distinction between "intensive inventions" (that lower the
costs of existing goods) and "originative inventions" (that produce a new result) more
than a half-century ago, and concluded that the former did not require the patent
incentive. See his The industrialand Commercial influenceof the English PatentSystem,
London,1908, pp. 52—55.
"It can be assumed with some justification that free-lance inventors are affected by the
patent system but not the antitrust laws, that the normal product-improving research of
industrial firms is affected by the antitrust laws but not the patent system, and that both are
motivated primarily by commercial incentives.
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quarter to one-half of total inventive activity in the United States is
governed by the profit incentive and the traditional means of public
control as embodied in patent and antitrust policies;18 until two
decades ago the share so governed was significantly greater, probably
as much as three-quarters to four-fifths.
These major shifts in the sources of financial support for inventive
activity, and the corresponding shifts in relative importance of the
instruments of public control, appear to be more or less permanent.
The McGraw-Hill forecast for 1969 estimates that government will
finance 56 per cent of total research and development costs, industry
40 per cent, and colleges and other nonprofit institutions 4 per cent.'9
Of the total research and development activities performed by industry,
it is estimated that government will finance 45 per cent and industry
55 per cent. The estimated slight increase in the share financed by
industry is based on the assumptions that (1) diplomacy will reduce
the intense arms race which has characterized the past decade, and
(2) industry will increase its outlays on fundamental (basic) research.
But even under these rather optimistic assumptions less than one-
half of total inventive activity would be governed by the traditional
private incentives and public instruments of control in 1969. The
already perceptible decline in the relative importance of those incen-
tives and the correspondingly larger role played by the budgetary
process can therefore scarcely be viewed as mid-twentieth century
ephemera.
Inventive Activity, Incentives, and Public Policy
THE PATENT SYSTEM
Public policy toward inventive activity in the United States can be
dated from the Constitution of 1787, which gave Congress the power
"to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." Congress exercised that power
in 1790 by enacting a law establishing a patent system, which was to
be virtually the sole instrument of public policy on inventions until
18Theauthor emphasizes theword"governs" and urges that it not be confused with
"induces." How much inventive activity the patent system induces is taken up later on.
19DexterM. Keezer, Douglas Greenwald, and Robert Ulin, "The Outlook for
Expenditures on Research and Development During the Next Decade," American
Economic Review, May 1960, p. 355.
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the enactment of the Sherman Act a century later,2° and the primary
instrument until it became eclipsed by the budgetary process at the
outset of World War II. It is still the principal instrument of public
policy toward inventive activity financed and performed by private
industry although, as will be shown later, the patent system has itself
been governed in no small way by antitrust policy.
While the rationale of patent systems varies from country to
country2t—and even from time to time within each country—most
students of the United States patent system appear to agree that it
finds its principal justification in terms of the following premises.
I. Prospective rewards to the inventor during the seventeen-year
period of protection will often exceed the costs of research, adaptation,
and disclosure. The prospective rewards would exceed such costs in
fewer cases were the seventeen-year property right not granted. Hence,
the patent system induces inventive activity which would not other-
wise be undertaken. Stated differently, in the absence of patent pro-
tection the social benefits of inventive activity often exceed the private
rewards; the patent system is designed to narrow the difference.
2. Prospective gains to society in the form of new products, pro-
cesses, and disclosed knowledge the patent system encourages exceeds
the social costs of the seventeen-year monopoly grant.
It is in terms of these two premises that the patent system, as distinct
from abuses of the system, must be assessed. If the system accounts
for a net increase in inventions having a value to society exceeding the
costs society pays for them, the patent system is justifiable in econo-
mic terms. It is worth pointing out that fulfillment of this condition
justifies the system irrespective of how much inventive activity the
system encourages, provided the costs of maintaining the system itself
is included among the costs society incurs. In, this sense the patent
system is not unlike any other incentive-creating public policy, for
example, a change in interest rates by the monetary authorities. Con-
ceptually, the system performs optimally if it produces marginal social
benefits equal to the marginal social costs it imposes, irrespective of
the level of activity at which this equality occurs.
Most of the thoughtful views expressed on the patent system—of
20Exceptions,as already pointed out, were the federal government's early research
activities in agriculture and defense, which until 1940 accounted for a small part of total
research.
21Foran excellent discussion of this question see Fritz Machiup, An Economic Review
of the Patent System,studyof the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 2nd sess., 1958, pp. 20 if.
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which there are many—have not been especially relevant to an
appraisal of the system in terms of these criteria. Those who apparently
accept the system as it presently exists lean heavily on the logical
appeal of the proposition that patenL protection is necessary to in-
duce inventive activity and the requisite investment to exploit it com-
mercially.22 Few economists who subscribe to this view regard the
patent system as an unmixed blessing, and some approve its retention
only because no superior substitute has yet been offered.23 It is em-
phasized, however, that this position finds its principal support in
the intuitive appeal of the a priori logic of the case rather than in any
empirical proof of the premises on which the case rests.
This does not mean that there is no factual information on how the
patent system affects inventive effort, but rather that the existing
facts scarcely add up to a reliable empirical test of the important
hypothesis. Several industry studies have developed persuasive evi-
dence that the patent system has promoted technological progress in
selected industries, often by making possible the entry of new firms to
compete with established, and patent protected, processes and pro-
ducts.24 And at least one recent study offers evidence that business
men regard the patent system as an important stimulus to research by
their respective companies and, because of the disclosure require-
ment, to the growth in usable knowledge and a reduction in wasteful
duplication of research effort.25 While all these studies point itt the
direction of the idea that firms undertake research when the resulting
discoveries may be patented (which they would not otherwise under-
take), and that the disclosure requirement enhances both the level and
exchange of patentable knowledge, the studies have developed
22Seeespecially citations of J. B. Clark, A. T. Hadley, Irving Fisher, Ludwig von Mises,
John Jewkes, F. W. Taussig, A. F. Ravenshear, F. von Weiser, and A. C. Pigou in Fritz
Machiup. op. ci,.,pp.33—40.
SeeJohn Jewkes, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman, The Sources of In vent ion,
London, Macmillan, 1958, pp. 251—253.
24SeeW. Rupert Maclaurin, invention and Inno vation in the Radio Industry,NewYork,
1949; Arthur A. Bright, Jr., The Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological Change and
Economic Development from 1800 to 1947, New York, 1949; Harold C. Passer, The
Electrical Manufacturers. 1875—1 900: A Study in Competition, Entrepreneurship, Technical
Change and Economic Growth, Harvard University Press, 1953; and in Patent, Trademark,
and Copyright Journal of Research and Education, June 1957: Nathan Belfer and Irving H.
Siegel,"Patentand Other Factors in the Development of Firms in the Custom Heat-
Treating Industry," pp. 57—73; and Weldon Weifling and Irving H. Siegel, "Patent and
Other Factors in the Growth of the Electronics Industry in the Boston Area," pp. 119—126.
25JesseW. Markham, James S. Worley, and Dwight S. Brothers, "The Value of the
American Patent System: An Inquiry into Possible Approaches to Its Measurement,"
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Journal, June 1957, pp. 20—56.
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relatively little information on the social costs at which these positive
benefits of the patent system are obtained.
Critics of the patent system have tended to direct their attack
toward the system's "abuse," and have only incidentally questioned
the system's logical basis. Hence, much criticism of the system envi-
sages the policy remedy of patent reform rather than the more drastic
remedies of outlawing the system altogether or replacing it with
another set of incentives and controls. The reasons generally advanced
for calling in question the premises on which the patent system rests
may be summarized as follows :26
1.The patent system was designed for the individual inventor, but
over the years research has become concentrated in the large corpora-
tion. This shift in location of inventive activity has rendered the
patent system obsolete.
2. The rise of institutional research—notably government, non-
profit organization, and institutionalized corporate research—has
rendered the patent system inapplicable to a large portion of inven-
tive activity.
3. Interfirm competition has become the primary stimulus to inven-
tive activity; the patent system is therefore no longer necessary.
4. The rise of monopoly has provided the business firm with suffi-
cient means of protection without resorting to patenting.
5.Thepurely formal test for the novelty of an invention has
encouraged the inventor, especially the large corporation, to keep
many important aspects of an invention secret. Further, to avoid
impairing the novelty of possible future patent claims, business firms
refrain from publishing scientific discoveries. In these ways the patent
system encourages secrecy rather than the publication of knowledge.
6. In an age characterized by publicity and efficient communications
it is impossible to keep important scientific discoveries secret. Hence,
under a patent system, society trades valuable monopoly grants for
information which it could get for nothing.
These six objections to the patent system are neither mutually
2GThesecriticisms, in slightly different language, may be found in the following
references: Sir Arnold Plant, "The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,"
Economica(newseries), 1934, pp. 44—46; Michael Polanyi, "Patent Reform," Review of
EconomicStudies, 1944,p. 71; Alfred E. Kahn, "Deficiencies of American Patent Law,"
AmericanEcono,nic Review, 1940, p. 479; SeymourMelman, TheImpact of the Patent
System onResearch,studyof the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 8, 18;S. C. Gilfihlan,
"The Prediction of Technical Change," Review of Economics and Statistics, November
1952, pp. 376—377; and Machiup, op. cit., pp. 28—52.
599WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY
exclusive nor internally consistent. In some cases conclusions follow
from unsupportable premises, and some observations which may be
factually true do not negate the traditional rationale for the patent
system. For example 5and6 obviously are inconsistent; if one is true
the other must be false. To a lesser extent so are 3 and 4: if it can be
stated as a general proposition that inventive activity is the primary
means of interfirm competition, it is difficult to see how protected
monopolistic positions have rendered unnecessary the additional pro-
tection the patent system affords. A world of firms vigorously com-
peting through innovations and one made up of firms with monopoly
power insulated from competitive forces obviously are two different
worlds. Moreover, although the prevailing level of monopoly power
may exceed that consistent with a competitively regulated economy,
there is no persuasive evidence that it has risen perceptibly over the
past half-century.27 It is probably true for a variety of reasons—one
of which was dealt with at length in the preceding section—that a
smaller proportion of inventive activity is governed by the patent
system than was the case in earlier years. However, the justification
for the system as an instrument of public policy does not lie in the
share of total inventive activity it governs.
Since almost all those who question the logical basis of the patent
system have either explicitly or implicitly based their conclusions on
historical changes in industrial organization, it is essential to inquire
into how these changes may have altered the relative social benefits
and social costs of the system.
Corporate enterprise has undoubtedly displaced the solo inventor
as the primary performer of inventive activity.28 It does not clearly
follow from this, however, that the social costs of the patent system
have increased relativeto its social benefits. Uncertainty, itis
generally agreed,29 is the essential characteristic of inventive activity.
A traditional rationale for the patent system is that, by holding out the
possibility of greater rewards for inventive activity that turns out to
be commercially successful, it encourages inventors to incur the costs
of uncertainty. Corporate enterprise obviously has not eliminated
the risks of uncertainty, as is sometimes claimed, but has simply
transferred them from the individual scientist—now largely, an
27SeeG. Warren Nutter, TheExtent ofEnterprise Monopoly in the United States,
University of Chicago Press, 1952.
28Seefootnote 13, supra.
29 Cf.Charles J. Hitch, "Research and Development and the Economy," in National
Science Foundation, Proceedings, op. cit., p. 132.
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employable factor—to the corporation itself. However, in at least one
way the rise of the large corporate research laboratory has reduced
uncertainty. The outcome of any one of the several dozen research
projects a large corporation may launch in a given time period may
be as uncertain now as it would have been fifty years ago, but it may
be relatively certain that at least one or two will turn out to be com-
mercial successes. Hence, the large corporate laboratory can, on the
insurance principle, reduce uncertainty through greater coverage and
larger numbers and, accordingly, can predict with greater reliability
the probable returns on its research outlays. But the expected returns
are themselves enhanced by the possibility of patent protection.
Hence, if it can be assumed that the marginal costs of inventive
activity turn upward at some point, it can be concluded that the patent
system stimulates some research that private firms otherwise would
not undertake—presumably the more costly and more uncertain pro-
jects.
The statistical evidence, while far from satisfactory, suggests either
that the research required to produce a patentable invention, or that
the research which does not lead to patents, increased substantially
over the past half-century. It probably suggests a combination of
both. In 1900 one patent was issued for every 1.7 scientists and
engineers in the United States; in 1954 one patent was issued for every
20.5 scientists and engineers.30 Research outlays by business firms
have increased, especially since 1930, more rapidly than the population
of scientists and engineers. Hence, the scientific manpower and dollar
costs per patentable invention or nonpatentable inventive effort, or
both, have increased enormously.3' Much of the high-cost research
characterized by uncertainty may have been stimulated by the patent
system; much of the research that was directed toward small product
and process innovations led to relatively few patents and probably
would have occurred in the absence of the patent system. The absolute
decline in recent years in the number of patents issued while research
Melman,op.cit., p.29. Melman infers from these data that the patent system is no
longer justified,or not as much justified as it once was.
Therate of patenting in industry groups relating to the mechanical and industrial arts
has declined while that in industry groups relating to chemistry and physics has increased.
Cf. Alfred B. Stafford, "Trends of Invention in Material Culture: A Statistical Study of
the Class-wise Distribution of Inventive Effort in the United States as Determined by
Patents Granted During the Period 1914—1945," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Chicago, 1950. This shift may have accounted for a portion of the increase in research
costs per patentable invention.
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outlays in the private sector registered large increases is consistent
with this interpretation.32
It is highly improbable that a single inflexible patent system can
apply optimally both to costly research contemplating major technolo-
gical breakthroughs and to competitive research aimed at maintaining
or strengthening a firm's market position in an established product
line. The existence of these two broad classes of inventive activity
suggests the advisability of a dual patent system, in principle analogous
to the familiar rationale for price discrimination. The system would
provide for relatively long periods of protection for major technolo-
gical breakthroughs, because they are of high value and involve un-
certainty and large research costs. It would also provide for much
shorter-term protection for inventive effort generally considered to
be an integral part of dynamic competition, and productive of incre-
mental changes no one of which adds substantially to society's total
stock of knowledge. Such a dual system would no doubt more nearly
equate the marginal social costs of both classes of inventive activity
with their corresponding marginal social rewards and, however great
the administrative difficulties, would go a long way toward resolving
important inconsistencies and conflicts in public policy—especially
those existing between patent and antitrust policies.
ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE PATENT SYSTEM
The insulation from the forces of competitive imitation the patent
system provides may raise no special problem and extract no unusual
social cost in economies where public policy regards monopoly as
neutral, or possibly even as desirable. But under United States anti-
trust policy the patent laws give to firms a protection from competitive
forces they cannot themselves erect with impunity. In short, it is
primarily because of antitrust policy that the protection the patent
system provides can be regarded as a serious social cost. In the lan-
guage of the late Joseph A. Schumpeter, such protection may be neces-
sary to induce those innovations which strike "not at the margins of
the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations
and their very lives."33 But to accord the same protection to innova-
32Throughoutthe 1930's annual average patent increases amounted to 48,520; in 1954
patent increases amounted to only 33,872 (Melman, op.cii., p.29). However, data
issued by the United States Patent Office since this paper was first written show that
patent increases in 1958 reached 48,405.
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed., New York, Harper, 1947, p. 84.
Those who may be tempted to invoke the authority of Schumpeter in defense of liberal use
of patent protection will meet with disappointment. Although Schumpeter defined
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tions of a much lower order, and which may result from the normal
course of vigorous interfirm competition in existing markets, com-
promises unnecessarily the principles of antitrust policy.34
Early United States patent policy logically surrounded the patent
with what at that time were considered to be effective safeguards:
exclusive use was limited to fourteen years; the patent applicant was
required to specify exactly what he claimed to have discovered and
fully to disclose it; and patents were to be issued only for technological
devices sufficiently useful and important to merit the reward of limited
exclusive use.35 Statutory safeguards were further strengthened by
the institutional environment to which they were addressed. In 1790
invention was almost entirely a matter of individual tinkering within
the area of the mechanical arts. Limitations on the individual's
inventive genius and financial resources assured society that no one
person alone could monopolize an industry through patenting or
patent accumulation.
In the hundred years that separated the first patent statute and the
Sherman Act—and for a decade or two thereafter—these safeguards
were substantially weakened by legislative revision, administrative
procedures, judicial interpretation, and unchecked abuse of the system
by private parties. In 1861 Congress lengthened the period of exclu-
sive use from fourteen to seventeen years, and through other statutory
amendments over the years enlarged the area of patent coverage. In an
1817 case Justice Story construed "useful" to mean any invention not
"mischievous" or "immoral."36 The Patent Office adopted procedures
which encouraged both the proliferation and abuse of patent rights.37
Business firms adjusted their practices to the weaker safeguards and,
as an impressive list of court cases shows, often overstepped the liberal
legal boundaries. Two students of the problem, summing up the situ-
ation as it existed in the first decade of the twentieth century, stated
that "...thepatent system had become a special sanctuary for trusts,
pools, and trade confederacies."38 Another observed that "...the
innovation as any alteration of existing production functions, his empirical observations
were confined almost entirely to those that brought on revolutionary changes, e.g., the
automobile, rayon, the chemical industries, and so on. These appear to be the innovations
he had in mind when he sought to justify temporary protection by private and public means.
This conflict between the patent right and antitrust policy is evidently being resolved
more and more in favor of antitrust; see below.
See George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise,
New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1951, pp. 450-452.
36Lowellv. Lewis, 15 Fed. Cases 1018 (1817), p. 1019.
Stockingand Watkins, op. cii., pp. 455—456, 58—59.
Ibid.,p. 454.
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protection of patent franchises had enabled big business to circumvent
the basic law prohibiting monopoly."39 These pronouncements prob-
ably exemplify the more extreme diagnosis but they are backed by
serious and responsible studies which make it clear that the patent
system, if left unchecked by a vigorous antitrust policy, can be made
an effective vehicle for the spread of monopoly power. Until 1890,
indeed until several decades thereafter, antitrust policy was something
less than effective. Inconsequence, the social cost of the patent system
unquestionably was enhanced, and no doubt some would argue that
the social rewards of the system were reduced.
Over the past three or so decades an unpublicized but discernible
trend has developed toward resolving conflicts between the past lax
patent policy and the recent relatively vigorous antitrust policy in
favor of the latter. Evidence of this trend is found in myriad sources,
but its specific content is more readily identifiable in selected court
cases. Decisions arising out of such cases have tended to (1) curtail
extension of the effects of the patent beyond the invention described
in the patent claim; (2) establish higher standards for patentable
inventions; and (3) prescribe compulsory licensing—sometimes roy-
alty-free licensing—of patents used, and abused, to further monopoly
power.
In 1912 the Supreme Court approved in the A. B. Dick case a
restriction the patentee imposed on an unpatented material used in
the patented device.40 It expressly withdrew this approval in the
Motion Pictures Patent case4' in 1917; in a series of cases decided in
the 1940's the Court established doctrines that the licenses could not
fix the prices of unpatented products produced by patented processes
or machines or where only a part of the product is patented ;42andin
1948 struck down a royalty provision based on the sale of an un-
patented as well as a patented commodity as an illegal price-fixing
device.43
Unless they result in industrywide price fixing, price restrictions
imposed by the patentee on the licensee are generally held, as in the
General Electric case, to be legal on the grounds that they are "nor-
Walton H. Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise, TNEC Monograph No. 31,
Washington, 1941, p. 62.
40Henryv. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.-1-(1912).
41MotionPicture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.-502, 510 (1917).
42SeeReport of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
Washington, 1955, p. 234.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 384—385 (1948).
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mally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the
patentee's monopoly."44 In recent years considerable effort has been
exerted to overturn this doctrine. In the Lime Material decision45
the failure to obtain a majority of the Supreme Court resulted in
neither affirming nor overruling General Electric. However, a district
court found illegal the particular price-fixing license before it in
Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co. in 1952.46Severalmembers
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws argued strongly that such price-fixing clauses not only should
be proscribed, but in fact have been proscribed in more recent Supreme
Court interpretations of the scope of patent rights.47 And in a series of
decisions beginning in 1942 the Court overturned a long-standing
rule of patent law to the effect that a licensee is not free to contest the
validity of the licensed patent. In these decisions the Court held that
the licensee did not forego this freedom where the license included a
price-fixing clause.48
In the last three decades the mortality rate for patents before the
various courts has substantially increased. It is not entirely clear
whether the increase in invalidations is attributable to a relaxation
of standards at the Patent Office or to a stiffening of the standards
used by the courts; however, most evidence supports the view that
the courts have begun to set higher standards of patentability—a
view the courts themselves seem to share.49 It would appear that
Congress has also imposed higher standards on the patent applicant.
The test set forth in the early patent statutes was whether the discovery
was "new and useful—or a new and useful improvement thereon not
known or used before." In I-!otchkiss v. Greenwood the Supreme Court
had added the additional criterion that "an improvement in the prior
art must involve more ingenuity and skill than would be obvious to
an ordinary mechanic in the art."5° Congress appears to have approved
this test in the Patent Act of
"United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
United States v. Lime Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
"105F. Supp. 372. (D.N.J. 1952).
Report of the AttorneyGeneral'sNationalCommitteeto StudytheAntitrust Laws,
pp.235—236.
"Ibid.,p. 234 at n.49.
"SeeGayChin, "The StatutoryStandard of Invention: Section 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act," Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Journal of Research and Education, Fall1959,
pp. 3 17—329, especially p. 318.
Ibid.,citing 52 U.S. 247 (1850).
35U.S.C. 103. The courts appear to be divided on whether this higher legislative test
is as high as that the courts themselves have established (see Chin, op. cit., pp. 320—323).
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A patent may not be obtained—if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
The courts have also shown a decided tendency in recent years to
deny the patentee exclusive use where it results in significant monopoly
power. According to S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, between 1941 and
1957 over 100 judgments, involving more than 300 antitrust defend-
ants, provided for compulsory licensing or the outright dedication of
as many as 35,000 patents.52 Because many of these were consent
judgments the judicial rationale for the trend toward compulsory
licensing and dedication of patents must be inferred from a small
number of decisions. However, in a few cases the courts have spoken
with clarity. In the United Shoe Machinery case Judge Wyzanski
stated :
Defendant is not being punished for abusive practices re-
specting patents, for it engaged in none,...Itis being required
to reduce the monopoly power it has, not as a result of patents,
but as a result of business practices. And compulsory licensing,
on a reasonable royalty basis, is in effect a partial dissolution on a
non-confiscatory basis
Judge Forman in ordering dedication of certain patents in the General
Electric case stated
In view of the fact that General Electric achieved its dominant
position in the industry and maintained it in great measure by its
extension of patent control the requirement that it contribute its
existing patents to the public is only a justified dilution of that
control made necessary in the interest of free competition in the
industry.
In the 1956 A. T. & T. consent decree55 all the patents owned by defend-
ents A. T. & T. and Western Electric Company were made subject
52Patent,Trademark, and CopyrightJournal, June 1957,pp. 135—136.
110 F. Supp. 295, 351 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd. per curiam 374 U.S. 521 (1954).
64115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
United States v. Western Electric Inc., civil action 17—49 (D.N.J), decree entered
January 24, 1956.
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to compulsory licensing to all domestic applicants, and about 8,600
patents involved in licence exchange agreements with three other large
electronic companies were made subject to royalty-free compulsory
licenses. The decree was hailed as "a sweeping patent victory" that
"will open up the electronics and television industry to competition."56
These are a few of the recent compulsory licensing and patent
dedication decrees based almost entirely on antitrust considerations.
In others, the issues of patent abuse and monopoly have often been
intertwined, but the resulting decrees have generally contemplated
remedies of the sort antitrust policy envisages; see, for example, the
1952 I. C. I. decree.57 This is a discernible break with traditional
patent adjudication, where relief usually consisted of an injunction
against the enforcement of patent licenses used to effectuate mono-
polistic control.58
The constraints antitrust policy has placed on patent usage are of
relatively recent origin and reflect the increased vigor of antitrust law
administration over the past two decades.59 In view of what is known
and, more importantly, what is not known about the operation of the
patent system, a strong argument can be made for assigning this role
to antitrust policy. The principle social costs of the patent system are
the temporary monopoly positions to which it gives legal protection.
Antitrust policy has provided the traditional means for mitigating the
excesses of monopoly to which such costs are attributable.
Summary
In the past two decades two significant developments have brought
about fundamental changes in the institutional environment of inven-
tive activity in the United States. (I) the share of total research and
development expenditures financed by government rose from 13 per
cent to a staggering 60 per cent; and (2) antitrust policy was strength-
ened and administered with increasing vigor. A concomitant of the
first was a large-scale substitution of the budgetary process for the
oeBusiness Week, January28, 1956, p. 160.
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215, 222 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
Cf. "CompulsoryLicensing by Antitrust Decree," Yale Law Journal, 1946, pp.77—81.
ilThereis little doubt that the trend since the late 1930's has been toward a more
vigorous antitrust policy. See Edward S. Mason, Economic Concentration and the
MonopolyProblem, Harvard University Press, 1957,p.400; Jesse W. Markham, "United
States Antitrust Po!icies: How Effective Have They Been ?"SouthernEconomic Journal,
July 1959, p.61.
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private profit incentive and the patent system as a means of governing
inventive activity. The second led to resolution of conflicts between
traditional patent policy and recent antitrust policy in favor of the
latter. Accordingly, the patent right has become relatively less import-
ant, and the protection it affords less absolute, than it once was. While
these developments have not rendered obsolete the historical debate
over the merits of the patent system they have clearly made it less
compelling.
The ascendency of government in inventive activity may be largely
explained in terms of national defense requirements, but the impact of
the research it sponsors is felt throughout the economy generally. Just
as the peaceful tin can may be drafted for war, so may atomic energy,
missile science, space photography, electronic computors, and so on,
be turned to peaceful purposes. The fundamental laws of nature, and
many of their applications, are unaffected by the state of politics.
With well over one-half of total inventive activity subject to govern-
ment control the budgetary process assumes paramount importance.
In a large area it has supplanted the traditional economic incentives
to invent. The economic and political considerations integral to the
budgetary process will play a major role in shaping the course of
inventive activity in the forseeable future. What these considerations
are and how they may be assimilated in welfare economics should be
an interesting and challenging subject for the political economist.
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